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7. The Making of France as a National State
Abstract
The west Frankish kingdom of Charles the Bald, which he had received in 843 as his portion of his
grandfather's great empire, is geographically the genesis of modern France. In the century of disorder and
confusion following the partition of Charlemagne's realm into three kingdoms, government fell into the hands
of powerful vassals. From the first, therefore, great lords in France exercised the functions of independent
rulers. In 987 they chose one of the weaker of their number, Hugh Capet (987-996), to be king. He and his
successors faced two great problems in establishing nationhood in France: how to recover and unite the
territories by wrestling control of the land from the great barons; and how to create and develop an effective
central government. [excerpt]
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7 , The Making , o f France as a National State 
The west Frankish kingdom of Charles the Bald, which he had 
received i n 843 as his portion of his grandfather's great em-
pire, is geographically the genesis of modern France . In the 
century o f disorder and confusion f ollowing the partition of 
Charlemagne's realm into three kingdoms, gover nment fe ll into 
the . hands of powerful vassals . Fr om the first, the refor e, great 
lords in France e x e r cised the functi ons ·o f independent rulers . 
In 987 they chose one o f the weaker o f thei r number , Hugh Cap~t 
(987-996), t o be king . He and hi successo two r f 
roblems in es t abl i s · at ionho d i xa~ce · how to recover 
and u ni te the erri ·· .s b t · c ant · "Ol o f the l and ~m 
the great barons· and how t o and develo i;l. af.f.ec.ti, e 
central_ gQYe nmen . 
( 
v p . 40 
Formidable obstacles prevented an e arly solution to t he 
first problem . The great semi-independent fiefs (Normandy, 
Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, Aquitaine , Champagne ~ and others) 
kept the territory divided and the government decentr alized . 
The geographical extent of France and its population , r oughly 
four times that of England, tended t o entrench local laws and 
institutions . The fi r st loyalty of most men was no t to the 
king, but to the local lor d . In the b -fecti~e 
authority of the Ca etians was co 
1J}e1r own es a ~s, a conso j.sjat.e 
surro'..lnded b 
:xx~£U~~~~~a~~a-~~ l 
e Ile de 
was to rule France-
but he himself 
either the Capetian 
F . ape founded a dynasty that 
continuously for eight centuries (987-1792 
never succeeded in enlarging to any extent 
boundaries or authority . 
sovereign . 
Capetians were 
d 
the 
Royal efforts to.,._-unify France were accelerat ~n.g_.the 
reign ():f- PbillP II (1180-I223 , wlio by 1ntrigue, diRlomacy, nd 
a convenient_Lack-o les _won ower a territory for the 
French thrQD While he depended on contingents of troops con-
tributed by his vassals for military manpower, he took steps to 
create an army loyal only to himself . He charte ed towns nd 
acceP-ted t fees and taxes as a wel u s 
ersonal 1ncome . In con rast to the experience in England, the 
creation o a national monarchy i n France was accomplished by 
the absorpti on into the royal domain of the large semi-independ-
ent duchies . This took place through warfare, marriage, or 
escheat to the crown . During his long reign Phili t r ipled t he 
size of the ar " u c centro hrewdly e ore-
stalled rebellions in the fiefs which he had absorbed by retain-
ing local offices yet handing over their duties to his own 
agent s . key official in his system was the bailli , ~ 
exercised al financial, JUdicial a nd militar o ers in t he 
te"i="ri tory o whicJl' he had een a ointed . T e p r incipal qua -
ification of the bailli, trained by the king , well paid, and 
( 
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often chosen from the r oyal r etinu e , was ndeviating l oyalt 
the monarch . 
Despite h i s s uccessf\ul wars against the English, which 
es tablished r oyal a · thori t y over muc h o f weste r n France ~ Phil ip 
Augustus ~ as Philip II came to be c al l ed , never won the a ffe c -
t i on and esteem of his people . This essential t o a per manent 
s t r engthening of the monarchy came during t he r eign o f his 
grandson, t he saintly Louis IX ·1226- 1270). Louis sou ght t o 
make t he government ser ve the inter e s ts and purposes o f monarch 
and s bject alike and in so do ing became the medieval ideal o f 
a king . His r eputation f or j ust dealing (he was known a s "a 
justice iE ermine"), his piety without s u bservience to t he 
Church, and his energetic devotion t o the welfare of the people 
.won him t heir affection during his lifetime and canonization 
after his death. It is a s an administrator and consolidator, 
however, that he contributed most t o str engthening the Fr ench 
s t a t e . He of adv~ c ou · a Fr ench curia 
regis , and extende d t e s cope of r o al ·ustice . tr~e to 
elimi at warf are e .e e n feudal lords a lbeit with onLy 
p a rtial success . When he die on a c rusa e in 1 70 he left 
France the s tronges t power in Europe , with an enhanced monarchy, 
growing cities, and developing national fee ling . Ye t a numbe r 
of gr eat fe dal duchies sti ll remained outside t he r oyal au t hor -
ity . 
A di fferent sort o f monarch was Philip IV ( 1285-1314) , 
grandson of Louis, whose handsome coun t enance and fri endly de-
meanor won for h im the sobriquet , "the Fair . " Calling fo r 
assistance upo n lawye r s trai ned in Roman law, Philip applied to 
the gover nment which he had inherited t he famous precept : " what 
p leases the p r ince has the fo r ce of law . " To man his enlarging 
bureaucracy he sought out capable men o f the middle class who 
were entirely dependent on h im for favor . The main or gan of 
royal go~r~t r emained t he bureaucrac and consa~1ent ly no 
~c xiated to p r ovide e · er the experience or the incen= 
tive fo r a ~opular c ~~e to~onarchia autnor i tY- . 
In an effor t 
naLkOn i n 1302 
~moners . This assembly 
French soci e ty, ge erally known as the Estates General, a t 
almos t the same t1 e as England's Model Parliament , but 
ev al restiae and influ e ce . We can 
s u ggest r easons f or this . n the first place , the Est 
Gene r al never gained contr o l o f the power ~· Again , its 
i ons never ex c a iv 
throu hout the kin do Al though its composition reveals t hat 
Phi lip r ecognized the value of inclu d i ng r epresentatives of the 
me rchants, professional men , and other townspeople t o better 
p e rsuade t hem to appr ove taxes , t he Estates General never be-
came a r allying point f or opposition t o the king . One explana-
tion of this fa i lure is that Fr ance had never been s ubject t o 
reorganization by a conqueror as had England under the Nor ma ns, 
( 
v p. 42 
and its fe dal lords were not practiced in cooperative action . 
In addit ion, the geographic length and bread~h of the land pro-
moted diversity of feudal instituti o~s a n d made genuine r epre-
sentative gover nme nt difficul t . 
The death of Philip JV in 1314 mar k e d t he beginning of a 
decline in t: he French monar chy whi c h lasted for over a century. 
Even as late a~ 1314~ much r emained to be done bef ore ch 
co"\ll d call themselves a na ~o s ate . 'I' ere wer e, for example, 
no general taxes p a i d b all _sub ' ects, an omission w ~c em ar-
rassed later kings . Strong p r ovincial feeling existed despite 
the effor ts of the crown to create a national civi c spirit. 
Moreover, Philip had thr ee sons who wer e not only weak kings 
but even lacked t he Capetian luck of siring male heirs . The 
youngest of these sons died in 1328, whereu pon French lawyer s 
revived and extended an old Franki sh law to bar females from 
the throne . This was i ntended to eliminate the claims o.f Edward 
III o f Engl a d ) who was the grandson o .f Philip t he Fai r through 
his mother . The claim of Philip of Valois, a ne phew of Phil ip 
IV, was recognized by the French and h i s ascension to the king-
ship led to a challenge from Edwa:t·d III . The p r etensions of 
this English monarch helped precipitate the Hundr ed Years' War. 
The s ignificant issue in this conflic t was whether the English 
wer e t o be expelled finally from the Continent or whether France 
and England were t o be united as a s ingl e state nder an English 
king. 
Final victor y for France did not come u ntil t he middle of 
the foll owing century after J oan of Arc ( 1412-1431 rallied her 
countr yme n and provided t he French with the inspirat ional lead-
ership which their r oyal f:amily could not offer . She nerved 
the heir to the throne , Char les Vll ' 1422-14 61 ) , t o exert him-
self and infused French troops with the necessary morale , 
Joan 's mission ended with t he coronation o f Charles a t Rheims 
in 14 29, and although the fighting dragged on until 1453 France 
was again united u nder a king whom the people credited with 
victory over England , Neither t he self-center ed French nobility, 
many o f whom had allied themselves with t he hated English , nor 
the Estates General , which had proved itsel f incapable o f p r o-
viding effective leadership, emerged from the conflict with 
sufficient r eputation to capture the loyalty and r espect o f the 
populat ion . The commerical class particularly welcomed t he 
prospect o f a str ong monarchy which would onc e more maintain 
order and promote trade a nd industr y , 
France , like England, emerged from these troublous times 
with monar chial authority enhanced . '!'his fact was most apparent 
during the reign of Louis XI ' 1461-1483 who profited from the 
wartime weakening of France ' s traditional institutions . Many 
Frenchmen had c oncluded that strengt hening the hand of the king 
was a p r erequisite to expelling the English . As a r esult Louis 
was abl e to make use o f a r ight gr anted t o his father d ring the 
war to levy a series of ~axes , chief of which was t he t.aill e , a 
proper ty tax that pr·ovided the bulk of r oyal reve mue until 1789 . 
He c alled the Estates General ~nto session but once d .ring his 
v p . 43 
reign, and even then summoned only those persons whom he thought 
wou l d not oppose his designs c He stamped o t the ambitio1 s p l an 
o f the duke of B' rgundy to make of that powerful duchy a sepa-
rate and indepen e nt kingdo~ and r educed other nobles by setting 
t hem against each other . He co ld ~ rn his attention almost 
entirely toward s-.ubject ing the French nobility since he had 
little fear of outside inte ference . Italy and Germany were 
disunited and he staved off a poT-ential English threar by buying 
off Edward IV and bribing the English ambassa ors . A master at 
d iplomati c intrigue, never loath to employ bri bery, and not 
bothered by charges that he was faithless, he tightened his hold 
o n the machinery of government and extended his influence through-
out France . La· · ' closest allies were the townsfolk whom he 
courted so much that he earne the title , "king o 
geoisJ.e, growing tax bur den was oflse'f =.-y--r-e-v~i"""'v--e---~p~ ros-
p e rity . His constant journeys into all parts o f his kingdom 
gave him valuable first-hand infor mation and kept him alert t o 
all movements which might threaten ~is position . 
which the Cape-
before had been 
